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1Introduction
"You'll never have all the information you need to make a decision – if you did, it would be a
foregone conclusion, not a decision" (Mahoney, 1988, p.156).
Risk is inherent to almost any business decision. New product development, capital investments,
and implementation of state of the art technology are often used as examples of risky business
ventures; while they may lead to major benefits, they may also result in important losses.
Outsourcing decisions, and contractual arrangements of the type required by an IT outsourcing
deal, are another example of a risky business endeavor. While it can lead to lower costs,
economies of scale, access to specialized resources, and new business ventures (Gupta and Gupta,
1992; Huff, 1991), outsourcing can have unwanted outcomes such as escalating costs, diminishing
service levels, and loss of expertise, to name a few (Earl, 1996; Gack, 1994; Lacity and Hirschheim,
1993).
This is not to say that outsourcing is bad in itself. It only means that, as in other risky business
ventures, risk assessment and risk management are important contributors to the success of an IT
outsourcing venture (Rao, Nam and Chaudhury, 1996). During the past five years, we have
conducted a number of studies on IT outsourcing in general (Aubert et al. 1996b, Aubert et al.
1999) and on IT outsourcing risk management in particular (Aubert et al. 1998; 1999; 2001). In
this paper we draw upon this research to provide a synthesis of the main lessons on IT
outsourcing risk and risk management we learned over the years.
The paper first defines the concepts of risk and of risk exposure and applies these definitions to
the context of IT outsourcing risk. It then presents a framework of IT outsourcing risk exposure.
Finally, it presents three case studies, each of which lead to a different set of lessons learned on
how firms actually manage IT outsourcing risk.
Risk Defined
Risk and risk management have been studied in many domains, such as Insurance, Economics,
Management, Medicine, Operations Research, and Engineering. Each field addresses risk in a
fashion relevant to its object of analysis, hence, adopting different perspectives of risk and of risk
management. Since it is essential that the conceptualization of risk and of risk management
adopted in a study be consistent, authors ought to clearly state the perspective they are adopting
in their study of risk. This section reviews the main perspectives of risk and of risk management
adopted in various fields, and then presents the perspective we adopted to study IT outsourcing
risk and risk management.
Risk as an undesirable event. In some situations, risk is equated to a possible negative event.
Levin and Schneider (1997; p. 38) defines risks as “… events that, if they occur, represent a
material threat to an entity’s fortune”. Using this definition, risks are the multiple undesirable
events that may occur. Applied in a management context, the “entity” would be the organization.
Given that perspective, risks can be managed using insurance, therefore compensating the entity
if the event occurs; they can also be managed using contingency planning, thus providing a path
to follow if an undesirable event occurs. This definition of risk is analogous to the concept of risk
as a possible reduction of utility discussed by Arrow (1983).
2Risk as a probability function. Some fields, instead of focusing on negative events, are
primarily concerned with the probabilities of an event. For example, medicine often focuses
solely on the probability of disease (e.g. heart attack), since the negative consequence is death in
many cases. It would be useless to focus on the consequence itself since it is irreversible. Odds
of occurrence are the key element. Data is used to determine what can influence those
probabilities (heredity, smoking habits, cholesterol level, etc.). In its definition of sentinel events
(occurrence involving death or serious injury), the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations uses “risk” as the chance of serious adverse outcome (Kobs, 1998).
Life insurance adopts this approach and uses mortality tables to evaluate these probabilities. In
this context, a “good risk” will be a person with a low probability of dying within a given period
(and hence, for the insurance company, a low probability of having to pay a compensation) and a
“bad risk” would be a person with a high probability of dying within the period.
Risk as variance. Finance adopts a different perspective of risk, where risk is equated to the
variance of the distribution of outcomes. The extent of the variability in results (whether positive
of negative) is the measure of risk. Risk is defined as the volatility of a portfolio’s value (Levine,
2000). Risk management means arbitrating between risk and returns. For a given rate of return,
managers will prefer lower volatility but would be likely to tolerate higher volatility if the
expected return was thought to be superior. Portfolio managers therefore aim to build a portfolio
that is on the efficient frontier, meaning it has “the highest expected return for a given level of
risk, and the lowest level of risk for a given expected return” (Schirripa and Tecotzky, 2000;
p. 30).
Risk as expected loss. Other fields, such as casualty insurance, adopt a perspective of risk as
expected loss. They define risk as the product of two functions: a loss function and a probability
function. Car insurance is a good example. In the eventuality of an accident, there is a loss
function that represents the extent of the damages to the car, which can range from very little
damage to the total loss of the car. There is also a probability function that represents the odds
that an incident will occur. The expected loss (risk) is the product of these two functions (Bowers
et al. 1986).
While in certain circumstances, the probability of occurrence of an undesirable outcome can be
estimated on the basis of past performance characteristics of the object under study (Linerooth-
Bayer and Wahlstrom, 1991), in several areas, probabilities are often difficult, if not impossible
to assess on the basis of past performance (Barki, Rivard, and Talbot, 1993). Consequently,
several risk assessment methods adopt the approach of approximating the probability of
undesirable outcomes by identifying and assessing factors that influence their occurrence
(Anderson and Narasimhan,1979; Boehm, 1991; Barki et al., 1993). In a software development
context, for instance, Barki et al. [5] have identified such factors, which belong to five broad
categories: technological newness, application size, software development team’s lack of
expertise, application complexity, and organizational environment. The degree to which each
factor is present in a software project will contribute to increase the probability of occurrence of
an undesirable outcome (here, project failure). Once this list is drawn, risk management methods
try simultaneously to reduce the loss related to the undesirable event itself (such as penalties
compensating for delays in the system delivery) or by reducing the probability of occurrence of
such an event, by reducing the level of the risk factors (for example, by carefully selecting team
members). While the definition of risk is not explicit about probability distribution, these
3probabilities (taking the form of factors) are taken into account when the risk evaluation is
performed.
Endogenous and Exogenous Risk
Another important distinction in risk analysis is the notion of endogenous versus exogenous risk.
Exogenous risks are risks over which we have no control and which are not affected by our
actions. Earthquakes or hurricanes are good example of exogenous risks. Although we have
some control over the extent of damage by selecting construction standards, we have no control
over the occurrence of such natural events. Endogenous risks, on the other hand, are risks that
are dependent on our actions. Car accident is an example of risk where a strong portion is
endogenous. While a driver has no control over other drivers (the exogenous portion), the
probability of an accident is strongly influenced by the driver’s behavior and ability
(endogenous). The driver also controls part of the loss function, by deciding to drive an
expensive car or a cheap car. This is why there is always a deductible amount with car insurance,
to ensure that the driver will behave in a way that will minimize the endogenous portion of the
risk. By being responsible of a portion of the damages, the driver is enticed to act with caution.
Risk management tools take into account whether risk is endogenous or exogenous. In finance
for example, risk is considered exogenous. The methods used to manage risk are concerned with
diversification, insurance, and allocation of assets. There is no direct action that managers can
take to reduce the probability of a given event. In engineering or medicine, a portion of the risk is
always endogenous. Risk management takes it into account. Patients are informed of the portion
they control and are proposed more healthy diets and lifestyles, employees are provided with
security guidelines and actions are taken to reduce directly the probability of undesirable
consequences.
IT Outsourcing Risk
Our study of IT outsourcing risk management uses the expected loss perspective. When
referring to the set of specific risks to which the firm is exposed, we will use the term risk
exposure. Risk exposure is therefore defined as:
 i P(UOi) * L(UOi)
where P(UOi) the probability of an undesirable outcome i, and L(UOi) the loss due to the
undesirable outcome i (Boehm, 1991; Teece et al, 1994). Therefore, we are considering
simultaneously the potential losses associated with an outsourcing contract and the probability
function of such losses.
It is important to note that only the negative side of the distribution of all potential events is
considered in this definition of risk. Positive events are not considered. This approach is justified
for many reasons. The main reasons are the overly positive attitude of managers entering in
outsourcing contracts and the managerial perception of risk. These two reasons are briefly
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Managers making decisions with respect to IT and outsourcing are often overly optimistic
(Hirschheim and Lacity, 2000). They take their decision to outsource based on a best case
scenario. There also seems to be an inflation about reported outsourcing benefits (Saunders,
Gebelt and Hu, 1997) which probably sustains this optimism. This overly confident view of the
4managers when entering into a contractual relationship is in itself a sufficient reason to consider
only the potential downsides of the contract when evaluating outsourcing risk. If managers
based their analysis on a best case scenario, the only unpredictable events that can occur are
undesirable. This may explain why, in the 61 outsourcing decisions reported by Lacity and
Willcocks (1998), 56% of the managers indicated that expected cost savings were realized, 23%
mentioned that expectations were not met while 21% could not tell. No one reported that cost
savings exceeded expectations. This is a typical result when decisions are made according to a
best case scenario, at the positive end of the possible outcome distribution.
This behaviour is consistent with the managerial perception of risk. March and Shapira (1987,
p.1407)) reported that “Possibilities for gain are of primary significance in assessing the
attractiveness of alternatives (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986), but “risk” is seen as
associated with the negative outcomes.” In this sense, the behaviour of managers in weighing up
outsourcing decisions is similar to generic manager’s behaviour.
Assessing IT Outsourcing Risk Exposure
While theoretically risk exposure can be computed and a value of risk established in dollar terms,
in practice it is more useful to map the risk exposure on a two-dimension plane (the usefulness of
this representation will be discussed in the risk management sub-section). Figure 1 illustrates the
mapping of risk exposure.
Figure 1: Risk exposure
To evaluate risk exposure, it is therefore essential to identify the array of potential undesirable
outcomes that could occur with respect to an outsourcing arrangement, as well as the probability
of occurrence of such outcomes. In any situation, several undesirable outcomes may occur. The
loss due to a given undesirable outcome can be approximated either via quantitative analysis (for
instance, by evaluating the amount of sales lost due to disruption of service to customers) or via
qualitative assessment of the organizational impact of each negative outcome (by using Likert
scales to assess the importance of the impact of the undesirable outcome). The probability of
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5undesirable outcomes is assessed by identifying and measuring the factors that influence their
occurrence.
The risk assessment framework relies mostly on Transaction Cost and Agency theories. These
tackle directly the problems related to contracting and provide both a roadmap to potential
negative consequences and their corresponding drivers (risk factors). A complete description of
the theoretical background was given in Aubert et al. (1998). The following paragraphs briefly
summarize the gist of the argument.
Foundations of Contractual Risk
Fundamentally, outsourcing is a contract in which a client relies on a supplier for a given
service, instead of depending on internal provision. In this case, the client relies on the market
rather than on employment contracts.
According to transaction costs theory, the decision to use the market to regulate a transaction will
depend on: the specificity of the assets, the uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and the
frequency of the transaction. The specificity of an asset creates a lock-in situation where a party
could extract a quasi-rent from the contracting party by threatening to withdraw from the
transaction. The usual manner to resolve the asset specificity constraint is to use long term
contracts. However, uncertainty may preclude contract agreement since the parties cannot predict
what will be needed in the future and, consequently, cannot write a contract (Williamson 1985,
1989). Severe measurement problems might also prevent contractual agreement since it becomes
impossible to know if performance is attributable to one party’s action or to externalities (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972). All contract provisions, to alleviate these problems, make contracting more
costly. When these costs are too high, it might be cheaper to purchase the residual rights over the
activities in exchange of a salary (Grossman and Hart, 1986). This contract enables one party
(the employer) to choose, in the future, the actions appropriate to the context (Simon, 1991).
Finally, a firm will prefer to bear the cost of the risk associated with specific investment or
uncertainty rather than to invest in order to internalize a single transaction. Internal organization
is only efficient for frequent transactions.
Agency theory is concerned with the client’s problem to choose an agent (outsourcer), motivate
it and coordinate its decisions and behavior with those of the organization. The client wants the
outsourcer to perform its tasks as required. However, writing and enforcing complete contracts is
utopia. The agency costs include the cost of writing and enforcing contractual agreements and
the residual loss resulting from inadequate coordination or motivation. Agency theory tackles the
important issue of designing efficient contractual agreements (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Agency theory generally distinguishes three main villains: moral hazard, adverse selection, and
imperfect commitment. Moral hazard stems from the fact that it is impossible for a principal to
observe an agent’s behaviour at no cost. Since it cannot tell, and since the supplier knows this,
the supplier can always blame poor performance on circumstances beyond its control. Cheating,
shirking, free-riding, cost padding, exploiting a partner, or simply being negligent are everyday
instances of moral hazard. Adverse selection will develop when the principal cannot observe the
characteristics of the agent. Failure to deal adequately with adverse selection will make it very
difficult for the client to choose the right supplier. The last potentially damaging manifestation
of opportunism is imperfect commitment. For instance, clients and outsourcers may be tempted
6to renege on their promises and commitments, arguing unforeseen events like changes in
requirements (Sappington, 1991).
Using this theoretical framework, a list of potential negative outcomes and associated risk
factors has been developed and validated using case studies (Aubert et al, 1999, 2001). The
potential negative outcomes are related to three main categories: service, costs (of various
forms), and externalities.
Potential Negative Outcomes
Under the service label, two problematic situations can occur: the services delivered do not
correspond to the ones the company needs or the service are of poor quality. The first case
usually occurs when the company, after establishing in a detailed contract the services to be
delivered, changes its needs over time. Then the services required differ from the ones stipulated
in the contact. This leads to a negative consequence: costly contractual amendments. In the latter
case, the services might be the appropriate ones, but their quality is not up to expectations. It is
important to note that these problems can occur with internal provision. However, since the
employment contract is more flexible than a market contract, services can be readjusted more
easily when service is delivered in-house.
The second main category pertains to costs. Clients can face costs that were not anticipated:
there can be transition and management costs that make the contract less profitable than
anticipated. Switching costs (preventing repatriation or transfer to another supplier) can be built
over time, and finally, the costs of the services themselves can escalate.
Finally the client can face two main indirect consequences. The first one is a loss of
competences. By relying on external provision, the organization will stop nurturing some
competences. When these competences are close to the core competencies of the organization,
such loss might threaten future organization action (Roy and Aubert, 2000). The other potential
treat is the possibility of disputes and litigation. While haggling is not in the mind of
organizations when they negotiate their contracts, such occurrence is always possible.
Risk Factors
The above mentioned potential consequences do not occur randomly. Many factors play a role in
increasing their probability of occurrence. As mentioned earlier, these factors are drawn in a
large measure from Transaction Cost, Agency and Incomplete Contract Theories. They can be
grouped into three main categories: the principal, the agent, and the transaction itself. These
elements all deal with market failure. The clients themselves are often a major risk factor. They
key characteristics to consider with respect with the client are linked to knowledge: experience
and expertise with the activities outsourced, and with outsourcing contracts. The other element to
consider is the culture of the organization, to ensure a cultural fit with the supplier. Also, many
characteristics of the suppliers should be considered. First, its experience and expertise with both
the activities handled and the management of outsourcing contract is critical. Second, the
supplier size, its financial stability and its culture. The number of suppliers is also a concern. A
client facing a thin market will increase the risk of lock-in. Finally, the transaction itself, namely
the activities chosen for outsourcing, is a key component of risk exposure. As transaction cost
theory indicates, activities that are uncertainty, difficult to measure, or that involve the use of
specific assets present higher chances of leading to contractual problems (Williamson, 1985).
7Activities that are complex and intertwined with the rest of organization activities (high
interdependence) also increase the chances of problems, so will a contract of a very large scope.
These outcomes, with their associated factors, are summarized in Table 1. The outcomes are
presented with the factors presenting the strongest effect on the probability of occurrence of each
outcome. This does not imply that other factors cannot have an influence on a give outcome, it
simply means that these are the critical factors.
Table 1. Components of IT outsourcing risk exposure
(Adapted from Table 1 – Aubert et al. 2001, p.2)
Undesirable outcomes Factors leading to outcome
Unexpected transition
and management costs
(Cross, 1995; Earl,
1996; Nelson et al,
1996)
• Lack of experience and expertise of the client with the activity
(Earl, 1996; Lacity et al, 1995)
• Lack of experience of the client with outsourcing (Earl, 1996)
• Uncertainty about the legal environment
Switching costs
(including lock-in,
repatriation and
transfer to another
supplier) (O’Leary,
1990)
• Asset specificity (Williamson, 1985)
• Small number of suppliers (Nam et al. 1996)
• Scope
• Interdependence of activities
Costly contractual
amendments (Earl,
1996)
• Uncertainty (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982)
• Technological discontinuity (Lacity et al. 1995)
• Task complexity
Disputes and litigation
(Aubert et al. 1997b;
Lacity and Hirschheim,
1993)
• Measurement problems (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982)
• Lack of experience and expertise of the client and/or of the supplier
with outsourcing contracts (Earl, 1996; Lacity et al, 1995)
• Uncertainty about the legal environment
• Poor cultural fit
Service debasement
(Lacity and
Hirschheim, 1993)
• Interdependence of activities (Aubert et al. 1997; Langlois and
Robertson, 1992)
• Lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity
(Earl, 1996)
• Supplier size (Earl, 1996)
• Supplier financial stability (Earl, 1996 )
• Measurement problems (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982)
• Task complexity
Cost escalation (Lacity
and Hirschheim, 1993;
Lacity et al, 1995)
• Lack of experience and expertise of the client with contract
management (Earl, 1996; Lacity et al, 1995)
• Measurement problems (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982)
• Lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity
(Earl, 1996)
8Table 1 – cont'd
Undesirable outcomes Factors leading to outcome
Loss of organizational
competencies [Dorn,
1989; Earl, 1996;
Lacity et al, 1995]
• Scope
• Proximity of the core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990)
• Interdependence of activities
Hidden Service Costs
(Lacity and
Hirschheim, 1993)
• Complexity of the activities
• Measurement problems (Alchian and Demsetz)
• Uncertainty (Barzel, 1982)
The objective of risk management is to reduce the level of risk exposure of a given business
venture. Given an expected level of benefits from an outsourcing strategy, a rational, profit
maximizing, and risk-averse decision maker wishes to minimize the risk exposure of the project
or the strategy. A bounded rational decision maker may wish, for the same given level of
benefits, to bring the level of risk exposure below some threshold or acceptable level (this is a
“satisfying” decision rule, in Herbert Simon’s terminology ). In both cases, reduction of the level
of risk exposure can be achieved in two ways: either by reducing the losses associated with the
undesirable outcomes, or by lowering the expected probability of occurrence of such outcomes.
The Case Studies
In order to better understand and analyze how IT outsourcing risk was managed in organizations,
case studies were conducted in three different firms. For each firm, data were collected on one or
several outsourcing decisions, from the following sources: requests for proposals, supplier
proposals, contracts and addenda, and interviews with managers who had been involved in the
decision process and managers in charge of overseeing the contracts. Using this data, each
researcher independently assessed the risk level of each outsourcing decision, by rating the risk
factors and the undesirable outcomes listed in Table 1. The impact of each outcome was assessed
on a 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) scale. Then, the probability of occurrence of each outcome was
approximated (on a 1 to 7 scale) by first evaluating each of the risk factors associated with the
outcome and then by aggregating the values of all the factors. The independent assessments were
then compared and discussed, until a final assessment was agreed upon.
The cases illustrate three different dimensions of IT outsourcing risk management. The first case
shows the importance of using a formal risk measure and explicitly assessing risk. The second
exemplifies how risk management is the result of a series of compromises. Organizations
reducing a risk often increase another one. It is a matter of selecting the risks you are willing to
take. Finally, the third example is an epitome of risk management. An example in which the
client had the resources and the knowledge to negotiate a contract with an impressive array of
risk management mechanisms. Since a detailed description of each case is provided elsewhere,
details about the cases are omitted below.
Managers Attitude Toward Risk
The first case is that of GVDL, a large insurance company. Two system development
outsourcing decisions and the resulting contracts were analyzed : the Year 2000 project and the
9Application development partnership project (see Aubert et al. 1999). The first project was the
Y2K conversion of the legacy system. The estimated effort required for migrating all the systems
through the millennium was more than 25000 person-days. The second project was called the
Application development partnership project. The firm had decided to stop awarding contracts to
many different suppliers and to select a single (or maybe a few) application partner that would
invest time and resources in understanding the company and its needs. The results of the
assessment of risk exposure for these two outsourcing decisions are presented in Figure 2 (black
icons represent initial risk levels).
From Figure 2, it seems quite clear that project 1 (Y2K) was less risky that project 2. While
many potential consequences (service debasement, lock-in and cost escalation) had high values
for project 1, the probabilities were generally very low, with the exception of cost escalation,
which was fairly probable. Project 2 was riskier. Items 3,6, and 7 have mid-range probabilities of
occurrence and the losses associated with both lock-in and contractual amendments would be
very high. The organization took several measures to lower the risk exposure associated with
both contracts.
Figure 2: Insurance Company
In the Y2K contract, protection against lock-in was sought through sequential contracting. By
splitting the work to be done in many sequential steps, the client ties the duration of the contract
to verifiable performance on the one hand and leaves open the possibility of walking out of the
relationship if things were to take a bad turn. In the case of service debasement, the main
mechanism used by the client to reduce the probability of occurrence of this outcome was the
inclusion of an important penalty for underperformance. This penalty was equal to five times the
total value of the contract. Doing so elicits greater efforts from the supplier and serves as a type
of insurance, thus reducing the monetary value of the consequences. Finally, in view of cost
escalation, the client secured guaranteed rates and the parties agreed ex ante on the evaluation
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method and relied on a detailed inventory of the various components, languages, platforms, size,
complexity, testing environments, interactions with other systems, etc. As shown by the arrows
drawn in Figure 2, the potential losses associated with lock-in, service debasement and cost
escalation are reduced.
In the second contract, the risk exposure stemming from lock-in was reduced in two ways. The
first one is multiple sourcing: three were selected to work concurrently, which seriously curtails
the probability of being locked-in for the client. Renegotiation problems and costly contractual
amendments are handled through the separation of assignments in addenda. This enables the
partners to actually modify their contract without costly renegotiations. It is an ongoing
modification process that is included in the contract (sequential contracting). Risk is greatly
reduced.
Among the interesting facts from this case is the perception of the managers. From Figure 2, it is
quite clear that project 2 was riskier than project 1, whether one considers the risk before or after
the risk management mechanisms are introduced. This result greatly surprised the managers.
Their initial impression was that risk exposure was much greater with their project Y2K than
with the partnership one. They agreed with the results presented in Figure 2 and realized that
their evaluation was inaccurate. Their mistaken evaluation is coherent with remarks made by
March and Shapira (1987). Managers perceived risk because some potential losses were high,
failing to recognize that the probabilities of such losses (in project 1) were dim. Another factor
was the time frame of both project. Consequences from problems with project one were almost
immediate (January 2000). On the other hand, project 2 was a long term venture and many
potential negative consequences will only unfold in a 2-5 year horizon. This might explain why
project 2 was perceived as less risky. The risks involved were not recognized because they were
too distant.
Lessons Learned
This case teaches us three main lessons. First, conducting a formal assessment of risk exposure,
and mapping explicitly the risk exposure associated with a contract enables efficient risk
management. Managers can immediately target the elements presenting high risk exposure and
implement risk management mechanisms (while it was not used here, a drastic mechanism is to
keep the activity in-house). Second, such explicit chart of risk exposure offers a remedy to some
managers’ biases. In this case, managers failed to recognize potential threats that were not in an
immediate future. Their evaluation of events with very low probabilities was also biased. Third,
by comparing projects and ordering them more accurately in terms of risk exposure, the
organization can manage its outsourcing portfolio more effectively and ensure that efforts in risk
management are allocated where they are the most profitable.
Risk Management as a Series of Compromises
The second case study was conducted at British Petroleum (BP). This case illustrates how risk
management and learning can eventually transform risk into a “choice” rather than a “fate”
(Aubert et al., 2001). British Petroleum, has extensive outsourcing experience, and a history of
risk evaluation and management. The company employs more than 50,000 people and conducts
worldwide activities. Two contracts are compared. The first one, labeled BPX, involved the
outsourcing of IT activities linked to BP Exploration division (Cross, 1995). The second contract
– BP Global – concerns the whole IT organization (head office and divisions).
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First contract. The first contract was BP’s first major outsourcing venture, covering data centre
management, telecommunications, maintenance, and systems development. Risk exposure was
high (see Figure 3). Because of the extent of the contracts, hidden service costs was the major
threat. The main feature of the contract, in terms of risk management, was to rely on a
consortium of three vendors to supply the services. Also, the contractual framework enabled
BPX to renegotiate several clauses annually, further reducing this risk.
Disputes and litigations, costly contractual amendments, and loss of organizational competencies
were next in order of importance in terms of risk exposure. BPX recognised that disagreements
would probably arise both between the suppliers themselves and between them and BPX. BPX
tried to reduce the impacts of disputes and litigation but uncovered that European antitrust laws
prevented the three suppliers from joining in a formal alliance as originally planned. Given the
type of contract selected (multiple sourcing), contractual amendments and contract renegotiation
would presumably be limited the portfolio of activities of one of the supplier, limiting the extent
of changes. Loss of innovative capacity (competencies) was considered the biggest potential loss
resulting from moving so many staff out of the organization, especially since BPX had decided
to become a knowledge organization. Again, the consortium was the means whereby BPX could
reduce this risk because several suppliers would give access to a broader array of innovative
services (and knowledge) than a single supplier. However, no supplier would have the big
picture of the industry and the technology portfolio.
Figure 3: British Petroleum
(Reprinted from Aubert et al. 2001)
Second Contract. In 1998, BP changed its outsourcing strategy radically and decided that a
single supplier would replace the fragmented assortment of suppliers which existed. BP
evaluated that only two suppliers in the world were capable of providing services on such a
scale. Therefore, a costly lock-in situation could easily appear To reduce potential problems due
to the lock-in situation, BP included a one-year notice of termination, to help reduce the impact
of a potential lock-in. Other elements where potential negative consequences are high are cost
escalation and transition costs. The factors linked to cost escalation suggest a low probability of
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occurrence. BP has an extensive expertise and experience with outsourcing, the supplier is very
experienced with the activities included in the contract and is very competent in managing
contractual relationships. The most threatening factor is the presence of measurement problems.
One of the tools to reduce them will be benchmarking, which will be conduced on a regular
basis. Transition costs could also bring severe penalties. They would come with service
deterioration and business disruption. Transferring activities to EDS presents different risks in
different regulatory situations (different countries). To reduce the transition related problems, BP
increased the planning efforts in a wide variety of aspects. Interestingly, the overall cost of
transition is not necessarily reduced, but the unexpected part of it is.
Lessons Learned
The BP case provides two lessons. First, it is clear that learning occurred through the
management of the BPX contract, which translated into both lower probabilities for the
undesirable consequences and better risk management strategies in the second contract. Many of
the contractual choices were made with less naivety. Managers were more realistic about
potential loopholes in the arrangements and more aware of the limits of contracts. A key decision
in the second contract was to remove software development from the arrangement. Development
activities are more uncertain, more specific, and more complex than operations. By keeping them
outside the portfolio of outsourced activities, the BP managers reduced the probabilities of
occurrence of several undesirable consequences.
The second lesson is the notion that risk is a choice. The case showed that risk profiles can be
seen as compromises. A given risk management mechanism could lower one type of risk while
increasing another one. For example, when BP decided in the third contract to deal with a single
supplier, risks related to measurement problems were less probable. However, this was done at
the expense of an increase in the risk of lock-in. As managers become more aware of the control
they have on the risk profile of their IT outsourcing strategy, they should bear more
responsibility over the outcomes.
Risk Management and Contract Design
The last lessons come from the outsourcing contract of Niagara (name changed) (Aubert et al.,
1997b). Niagara is a large Canadian Crown corporation, employing more than 50,000 people,
with an annual income of over $5 billion. It concluded a complex outsourcing arrangement with
three suppliers. When it decided to outsource its IT services, the organization was extensively
developing new software (1000 persons full-time) and having a hard time doing so. Although
Niagara recognized that IT could radically change the way it did business, IT and software
development were not within the core of Niagara competencies. The organization had problems
hiring and retaining IT people. It was dealing with a vast number of consultants, without taking
advantage of the consultants distinctive skills. Finally, Niagara had the feeling that some of the
software solutions developed were innovative and could be sold to other similar organizations in
the world. However, it did not have the skills nor the infrastructure to do so. Selling software was
not its business.
The risk involved with outsourcing all the IT services, as was intended, was high (see Figure 4).
Lock-in was the most important threat. Because of the sheer size of the contract, lock-in could be
very costly. The probability of a lock-in was also high, mostly because of the specific nature of
the software developed, and the limited number of suppliers that could handle such a large
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contract. Hidden costs were also to feared. The complexity of the activities, the number of
different systems to integrate and the scope of the contract made hidden costs a likely menace.
Similarly, cost escalation and costly contractual amendments would lead to severe losses. In the
case of such a large contract, it would be tempting for a supplier to argue higher than expected
costs and renege on the promised fees. Changes to any contract would also be probable because
of the wide variety of services and the level of innovation in the field.
Figure 4: Niagara
Niagara had some precious resources when considering outsourcing. Most notably, the
organization has a long tradition of measurement. Every activity in the organization is measured,
and the organization had impressive charts and data about the resources required for developing
or operating software. They had measurement guidelines for all types of application, based on
the vast number of projects done by the organization or sub-contracted. They had enough
internal data to benchmark potential suppliers.
Niagara finally signed an original deal, integrating several risk management mechanisms. They
decided to use three suppliers. Each one was responsible for a given portfolio of activities and
had an area of responsibility. The outsourcing contracts placed the three outsourcers in the
unusual situation of having to cooperate and/or compete on almost every project. They had a
group of activities allotted to them. For any new project, Niagara asked one of the three a cost
estimate. This estimate was compared to internal ones and, if acceptable, the contract could be
given without further delay. If unsatisfactory, Niagara could ask the other suppliers to bid.
External bids could also be sought. The three suppliers were preferred because they had a much
better knowledge of the organization. They still had to remain honest to retain their share of the
overall IT activities.
Another element of interest was the outside deals. The suppliers had the infrastructure to sell
outside Canada the software developed. The outsourcing deal established a joint venture between
Niagara and its suppliers to do so. At the time the case was written, they were transferring its
technology to eight countries. Neither the client nor the outsourcers would have had the capacity,
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alone, to market that technology. The reputation of Niagara and the skills of the suppliers were
essential elements in the success of the joint sales venture abroad. These external deals were
extremely attractive for the outsourcers. While they were a source of revenue, they also served as
great goal alignment mechanisms between Niagara and its suppliers, reducing potential
“cultural” differences at the same time. They acted as a bond, guaranteeing satisfactory service to
the client.
The competition between the suppliers reduced the expected losses associated with hidden costs
and cost escalation. So did the benchmarking. Before undertaking a new software project, key
indicators such as cost per milestone, total development cost, elapsed time, and total cost minus
fixed assets, were used to assess it. These parameters were clearly specified ex ante so the
suppliers knew how they were being evaluated. Activities were measured on a regular basis,
graphing the number and types of problems, their category according to security level, and their
overall impact. Also, by separating the portfolio into three parts, any cost escalation due to
opportunistic behaviour of a supplier would be limited to a third of the overall portfolio.
Cost escalation was also limited by the use of countervailing incentives. In their dealing with
Niagara, the outsourcers were responsible for the maintenance of the systems they had
developed. Consequently, they had a strong incentive to develop efficient systems, so as to
minimize their maintenance efforts. Linking two stages of production can provide an incentive
for an agent to perform in the principal's interest. When two stages of production are not
independent an agent may be motivated to perform better if it is responsible for both stages. By
putting extra effort into the first stage, it will reduce the effort required at the subsequent stage.
Inversely, by shirking during the first stage, it will increase the effort required later. The result is
that the agent cannot claim to have made an excessive effort at both stages.
Monitoring was used extensively to reduce the risk of service debasement. Each deliverable done
by a supplier had to be approved by one of the two other supplier. Once a piece of work was
approved, the supplier approving the work became responsible for its judgment (and for handling
the costs related to problems). An interesting result of this type of arrangement was that Niagara
automatically obtained a third party view of each supplier's work.
Lessons Learned
This case teaches two lessons. First, risk can be managed and efficient contract design can
drastically reduce risk. In many ways, Niagara was able to implement several of the features that
British Petroleum wanted to include in its first contract. Because the regulatory regime in Canada
is different than the European one, there were no obstacle to such contract design. One key
element of this contract is that risk is not eliminated, it is mostly transferred to the suppliers.
They become responsible for many of the potential negative events that can occur. They are
positioned in a way that makes them guardians of the other suppliers on behalf of Niagara. Such
risk taking is unusual for the suppliers. When Niagara proposed this agreement to several
potential suppliers, many declined to bid. This further reduced the number of potential suppliers,
which explain why they probability of lock-in increased (while the potential loss decreased
because of the dividing of the portfolio into three parts).
The other lesson is that size does matter. This sophisticated contract would not have been
possible if the portfolio of activities had been smaller. The suppliers agreed to enter into this
relationship because they expected to make money. They accepted to shoulder more risk than
15
they usually do because they anticipated greater benefits. Each one dedicated approximately 350
employees to the contract with Niagara. Moreover, the outside deals were a powerful incentive.
These other contracts made the relationship with Niagara especially precious and guaranteed the
client that suppliers would not threaten this relationship. All this apparel is only justifiable if the
size of the contract is significant.
Conclusion
The cases reported here support the proposed risk assessment framework and justify its use when
considering outsourcing. First, it helps correct some of the manager’s biases. It is difficult to
compare different alternatives that are associated with both probability distributions and different
loss functions. The human mind can only deal with a limited number of scenarios and a formal
analysis ensures that all key elements are taken into account.
The cases also support the notion that risk is a choice. This is especially true when risk is largely
endogenous, like with outsourcing risk. Managers have a choice between different sourcing
strategies, and numerous contracts for any given activity. By selecting any one of them, they
have to realize what they are selecting and what they are discarding. Risk exposure, once made
explicit, transforms the unexpected into an option selected consciously. These selections are
always compromises. Most risk management mechanisms involve reducing some types of risk
while increasing other, or accepting to pay a fee to reduce a given risk.
Finally, once risk exposure is explicit, and the possible compromises clear to the managers, risk
becomes a lot more manageable. Not surprisingly, organizations with a lot of resources,
awarding larger contracts, will have more flexibility when managing their risk portfolio and
more possibilities to reduce their risk exposure.
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